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The "Right" to an Abortion, the
Scope of Fourteenth Amendment
"Personhood," and the Supreme
Court's Birth Requirement
John D. Gorby*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The one theme which permeates the United States Supreme
Court's 1977 abortion pronouncements' is that the United States Constitution does not and the federal judiciary should not preclude legislative regulation of some aspects of the abortion problem. Indeed, the
decisions almost suggest that the essential nature of American society is
democratic. The Supreme Court's 1979 decision holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute requiring physicians performing abortion
to attempt to preserve the life of the aborted fetus, if the fetus "may be
viable," does not suggest the contrary, since it appears to be based on
the due process concept of vagueness as applied in criminal cases and

not upon any substantive expansion of the right to abort.2 In Maher v.
* B.A., 1961, Knox College; J.D., 1968, University of Michigan. Professor of Law, The
John Marshall Law School.
1. The decisions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), were announced by the Supreme Court on June 20, 1977. In
Beal, the Court held that a state participating in the Medicaid Program is not required by Title
XIX of the Social Security Act to fund the costs of nontherapeutic abortions; in Maher, the Court
held, inter alia, that the Constitution imposes no obligation on the states to pay pregnancy related
expenses and that a state does not violate equal protection by funding the costs of prenatal expenses but not nontherapeutic abortions because of the State's strong and legitimate interest in
encouraging normal childbirth; in Poelker, the Court held that a city does not violate equal protection by excluding nontherapeutic abortions from public hospitals since the Constitution does not
forbid a state or city from expressing a preference for normal childbirth.
2. Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675 (1979), decided January 9, 1979. Arguably Colautti
does limit legislative authority in the abortion area in spite of the Court's claim that it reaffirms
the principles of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 682. In Roe the Court had
observed that, in the medical and scientific communities, the fetus is considered viable if it is
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit by artificial aid," Roe, 410 U.S. at 160,
whereas in Colau/ti the Court wrote that "[v]iability is reached when, in the judgment of the
attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is reasonable likelihood of
the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support." 99 S. Ct. at 682.
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Roe,3 the Court noted: "We should not forget that 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts.' "I One paragraph later, the Court held
that "the Constitution does not require a judicially imposed resolution
of these difficult issues. ' Similar language was used in Poelker v.
6
Doe:
Although the Mayor's personal position [opposition] on abortion is
irrelevant to our decision, we note that he is an elected official responsible to the people of St. Louis. His policy of denying city funds
for abortions such as that desired by Doe is subject to public debate
and approval or disapproval at the polls. We merely hold, for reasons stated in Maher, that the Constitution does not forbid a State or
city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference
for normal childbirth as St. Louis has done.7
In spite of Mr. Justice Powell's suggestion in Maher that "[o]ur
conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it,"8 one
wonders if those words of reassurance are to be taken with the same
degree of seriousness as the assurance of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Roe
P. Wade9 that the Supreme Court was not reviving substantive due
process.' ° Indeed, the dominant democratic theme of Maher v. Roe,"
The change, if any, in the substantive law is in the degree of probability of survival required and
in the focus on the particular fetus as opposed to the fetus in the abstract.
3. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
4. Id. at 479-80.
5. Id. at 480.
6. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
7. Id. at 521. In the Bealolecision Justice Powell, writing for the Court, expressed a similar
view: "But we leave entirely free both the Federal Government and the States, through the normal processes of democracy, to provide the desired funding. The issues present policy decisions of
the widest concern. They should be resolved by the representatives of the people, not by this
Court." 432 U.S. at 448 n.16.
8. 432 U.S. at 475.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Mr. Justice Blackmun's assurance was:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement free of
emotion and of predilection. . . . We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905):
[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
410 U.S. at 117.
10. A major criticism directed against Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade is that
Lochner was in fact revived. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe, 410 U.S. at 174;
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Forward. Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1973); see text accompanying notes 119-26, infra, for further
discussion of Lochner and substantive due process.
11. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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Poelker v. Doe'2 and Beal v. Doe, 13 the bitterness expressed by the dissenters 4 (all previous members of the Roe majority), 5 the compulsion
of the author of Roe to dissent,' 6 and the continuing efforts to change
Roe with a constitutional amendment cause one to wonder if the majority in Colauti would not have preferred to have followed the spirit
of the dissenting opinions in Roe and left the entire abortion problem

in the hands of the state legislatures. This approach, at least on the
surface, would be consistent with recent suggestions that the judiciary
return to the fourteenth amendment its intended "procedural" as opposed to "substantive" significance, defer to the "spirit of our democ-

racy" in matters not controlled by the fourteenth amendment as
and not "govern" under the guise of interpreting
originally intended,
t7
the Constitution.
A legislative solution to the abortion problem is necessarily based

upon the premise that the Constitution is neutral about abortion and
does not impose a solution, one way or another.
In this article, the existence of such a premise is denied. More

specifically, this author concludes (1) that the Constitution is not neutral about abortion and does indeed impose a solution on the abortion
question; (2) that, as Justice Blackmun conceded in Roe, if the fetus is a

person under the fourteenth amendment, "the [plaintiffs] case, of
course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the [fourteenth] [a]mendment;' 18 and (3) that the concept of "person" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments includes unborn human life. 9 It thus follows that the solution to the abortion
12. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
13. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
14. Particularly that of Mr. Justice Marshall in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 454-62.
15. Dissenting Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun voted with the majority in Roe.
16. Mr. Justice Blackmun, author of the Roe majority opinion, in his Beal dissent, applicable
also to Maher and Poelker, wrote:
The Court today, by its decisions in these cases, allows the States, and such municipalities as choose to do so, to accomplish indirectly what the Court in Roe v. Wade and Doe
v. Bolton-by a substantial majority and with some emphasis, I had thought-said they
could not do directly.
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 462 (citations omitted).
17.

See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

18. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
19. The Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe held that the state could assert an interest in what it
termed "potential human life." The term "potential human life" appears to have been carefully
chosen, because, by concluding that the state has an interest in potential human life, the Supreme
Court hoped to avoid the necessity of deciding at least in the context of the Maher case when
human life begins, a problem the solution to which, according to Mr. Justice Blackmun in Roe,
has evaded philosophers, theologians and unfortunately also physicians throughout the centuries.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159. Since this paper is concerned with the scope of the "person"
concept in the Constitution as opposed to those matters in which the states may assert an inter-
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problem set forth in Roe 20 as well as that suggested by Justices White

and Rehnquist in dissent 2' are constitutionally unsound, both solutions
permitting the violation of the fetus's constitutionally protected right to
life without due process of law. More positively, there is substantial
historical support for the notion that the due process clause was
designed to guarantee access of all persons to the courts for the protec-

tion of fundamental rights,22 that those fundamental rights refer to
"life, liberty and property," 23 and that the unborn human being, as an
individual living human being, is a person under the Constitution and
is entitled to access to the courts to protect his fundamental right to life.
Since Roe v. Wade is the only case in which the Supreme Court
has considered the scope of constitutional "personhood" in the context
of pre-birth stages of human development and is the only Supreme
Court pronouncement on the subject, 24 a criticism of Roe will serve as
est-and since the proofs are replete that embryoes and fetuses of human beings are, at least from
the biological perspective, human and living-the term "unborn human life" is used. For an
excellent and detailed discussion of the biological proofs, see Krimmel & Foley, Abortion." An
Inspection into the Nature of Human Life and Potential Consequences ofLegalizing Its Destruction,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 725 (1977).

20. Roe permits the pregnant woman, as an aspect of her constitutional right to privacy, to
decide whether or not to abort.
21. Justices White and Rehnquist suggested in their dissent in Bolton which was also applied
to Roe that the resolution of the abortion problem should be left to legislative decision. 410 U.S.
at 222.
22.

See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-19 (1977).

23. Id. at 20. Professor Berger writes:
The "privileges or immunities" clause was the central provision of the Amendment's
§ 1, and the key to its meaning is furnished by the immediately preceding Civil Rights
Act of 1866. . .which, all are agreed, it was the purpose of the Amendment to embody
and protect. The objectives of the Act were quite limited. The framers intended to confer on the freedmen the auxiliary rights that would protect their "life, liberty, and property,"-no more. For the framers those words did not have the sprawling connotations
later given them by the Court but, instead, restricted aims that were expressed in the Act.
The legislative history of the Amendment frequently refers to "fundamental rights,"
"life, liberty, and property," and a few historical comments will show the ties between
the two.
24. Cf.Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Dred Scott was decided prior
to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and involved a construction of the notion of "citizen" in the Constitution, not "person." Although the case had the effect of excluding a human
group from enjoyment of constitutional privileges and immunities, a decision which resulted in
profound tragedy, it did not deal with the scope of the "person" concept. In this context it is
interesting to note that, despite the Court's holding in Dred Scott, slaves were considered to be
persons under the criminal law and were held responsible under the criminal law as well as entitled to its protections. See, e.g., J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 253-55 (12th ed.

1973). See also State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (I Walker) 39 (1820). It thus follows that the concept of
"person" in general legal usage was somewhat broader than the concept of "citizen," both terms
being used in section one of the fourteenth amendment. It is also noteworthy that the Supreme
Court has held that the phrase in the first section of the fourteenth amendment ("All persons born
within the United States . . . are citizens of the United States") was designed to overturn Dred
Scott and establish citizenship in the Negro. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873).
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5

a departure point for this discussion as to whether or not the fetus falls
within the scope of the constitutional personhood concept."
II.

THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD: THE PRIMARY
ISSUE IN THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY

That the Supreme Court accepted the scope of constitutional personhood as the primary issue in Roe is reflected in its statement that
"[tihe appellee [Texas] and certain amici argue that the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. .

.

.

If this suggestion of personhood is established, the

appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would
26
then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.
No one has openly quarreled with the Roe Court on this point, and
with good reason. The right to life represents a fundamental value in
the constitutional order. Not only do both the fifth and fourteenth
amendments explicitly mention "life" in their respective due process
clauses, 27 but common sense dictates that the right to life is a condition
precedent to the enjoyment and exercise of all other fundamental
rights, including Mr. Justice Douglas's "absolute" first amendment
rights; 28 it is the necessary foundation upon which all other human
rights are built. 29 After all, only the living can enjoy the freedom of
speech, the right peaceably to assemble, the right of assistance of counsel, the right of privacy, or even the right to decide to have an abortion.
30
Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the idea simply in Furman v. Georgia:
"An executed person has indeed 'lost the right to have rights.' "3' And
as a general rule, only those who feel that their "right to life" is secured
will dare exercise any other fundamental rights.
Historically, an important purpose of American civil government
has been to protect fundamental rights. Thus, history also supports the
25. See text accompanying notes 101-06, infra.
26. 410 U.S. at 156.
27. It is interesting to note in this connection the contention that due process of law is the
constitutional protection of the right to life. Cf. Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 THE MONIST 562
(1968). However, at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, due process was probably understood to provide both a procedure to protect such rights as "life, liberty, or property"
and the only legally proper method of limiting those rights. See note 23, supra.
28. See statements of Mr. Justice Douglas in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Compare the following statement from the Federal Constitutional Court of Western Germany in its abortion case: "Human life represents within the order of the Basic Law, an ultimate
value; it is the living foundation of human dignity and the prerequisite for all other fundamental
rights." Jonas & Gorby, Translationof the German FederalConstitutionalCourt Abortion Decision,
9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 605, 642 (1976).
30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Roe majority reasoning that if the fetus is a person, and thus entitled to
the right of life, the Court has an obligation to protect that right. John
Locke, whose influence on the thinking of the founders of this nation is
well known, wrote of the natural rights to life and property and that
"civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the
state of nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges
in their own case." 32 This principle, applied to the abortion problem,
suggests that, if the unborn does enjoy a natural right to life,33 the protection of that right should not be completely entrusted to the pregnant
woman since her self-conceived interests may conflict with those of the
unborn and since she could not be expected to be a fair "judge in [her]
own case." 34 The solution to this problem, according to Locke, would
be civil government as is the case for all conflicts between the rights of
one and the interests of another. These basic ideas found their way
into the Declaration of Independence in the clause to which the people
of this nation so frequently rededicated themselves during the recent
bicentennial year:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men . ..that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation
on such Principles .... 34a
Just fifteen years later, on December 15, 1791, at a time when natural
rights theories were still dominant in American legal thought, "life"
was explicitly included in the fifth amendment's due process clause.3 5
Although natural law fell out of vogue during the nineteenth century,3 6 the importance of the right to life in modem political and social
32. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 2 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).

33. In an interesting study of John Locke's attitude toward children and particularly the
unborn child, Joseph Witherspoon concludes that Locke must have considered the unborn human
a "person" and entitled to enjoy the natural right to life. See J. Witherspoon, John Locke's Concept of the Child as a Person (scheduled for publication in 1979).
34. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 2 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 157
(1950).

34a. E.

35. As indicated earlier, due process, rather than creating the rights explicitly mentioned in
the fifth amendment and later in the fourteenth amendment, actually provided a constitutionally
acceptable means of limiting the rights. According to the prevailing political theories, the rights
mentioned were natural rights which preexisted the Constitution.
36. Nevertheless, the ideas of Blackstone, who reiterated the ideas of Locke, were cited by the
supporters of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment. See notes 86-91,
infra, and accompanying text; see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20-22 (1977).
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theory has remained nearly unscathed as evidenced by the Third Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to life," 37 the Second Article of the European

Human Rights Convention38 and the arguments to abolish capital punishment expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan in Furman v. Georgia:39
"The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity of
the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members
to death."4 He also wrote that "[d]eath is a unique punishment in the
United States. In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life,
not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanc4
tion." '

Since the Court in Roe recognized the right to life issue as crucial
and was fully aware of the rank of this right in the hierarchy of fundamental legal values, one would certainly expect the Court to have carefully and thoroughly studied and analyzed the scope of constitutional
personhood as well as the nature of the unborn 4 2 to determine on the

most rational basis possible whether the unborn falls within that scope.
As the next section shows, the Court did no such thing.
37. G.A. Res. 217A(II1), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948).
38. "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law." European Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 4,
1950 (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1973). See also the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, Resolution XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States, May 2, 1948, Article I of which provides: "Every human being has the right to life, liberty
and security of his person." See also the American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov.
22, 1969, OAS Treaty Series, Article 4(1) of which provides: "Every person has the right to have
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
40. Id. at 296 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
42. The possibility exists that in the Court's eyes the major issue was not the scope of constitutional personhood as stated but rather other far-reaching problems. Some indication of this is
given in the Roe opinion itself. At the end of the opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote: "This
holding, we feel, is consistent. . . [inter alia] . . . with the demands of the profound problems of
the present day." 410 U.S. at 165. Although he did not specifically identify these "profound
problems," Mr. Justice Blackmun provided at least a hint by mentioning at the beginning of the
opinion that "population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and
not to simplify the problem." 410 U.S. at 116. If the Court's concern was to resolve or alleviate
these "profound problems" by allowing population reduction via the sacrifice of unborn humans,
the Court should have said so and allowed the matter to be debated on the merits of that issue
rather than presenting the problem of Roe in terms of construing several potentially conflicting
clauses of the federal constitution which guarantee individual rights. Although such an underlying concern could perhaps explain a poorly reasoned decision by a court on the stated issues, this
commentary accepts the Court's statement of issues and proceeds accordingly.
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THE PRIMARY ISSUE IN THE HANDS OF THE SUPREME COURT

ProceduralBackground of Roe v. Wade: The Unborn's "Day in
Court"

In 1970 and in early 1971, a number of abortion cases had been
43
appealed to the United States Supreme Court from Wisconsin,
45 Louisiana,4 6 Illinois 47 and North Carolina. 48
Texas,"4 Georgia,
The Illinois case was unique in that Dr. Bart Heffernan of Chicago
had been appointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the
unborn. As a result, only in the Illinois case, where standing had been
recognized, was the unborn permitted to directly participate through
his representative in a series of lawsuits which were to have a profound
impact on his legal and constitutional rights. 49 The Supreme Court,
however, set the Texas (Roe v. Wade) and Georgia (Doe v. Bolton)
cases, but not the Illinois case, which was also pending before the
Court, for oral arguments on December 13, 1971. Since the parties to

the Roe and Doe cases were, on the one side, physicians and women
challenging the constitutionality of the respective state anti-abortion
statutes and, on the other side, the attorneys general defending their
states' statutes, the fetus was not directly represented in the December
13, 1971, hearings. Because only seven justices heard the oral argu-

ments, Justices Black and Harlan having left the Court one month earlier, no decisions were handed down and the cases were set for
rehearing in October, 1972. In the meantime, the attorneys for the fe-

tus, whose guardian was an actual party only in the Illinois case and
had filed an amicus brief' ° one year earlier in both the Texas and

Georgia cases, filed in the Supreme Court a motion for oral argument,
which was denied in the summer of 1972. Shortly thereafter, they
moved to consolidate for oral arguments at the rehearing the Illinois
43. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. i
(1970) (dismissal for want of denial of injunction).
44. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
45. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
46. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
47. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. 111.1971).
48. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
49. Following the intervention by Dr. Heffernan in Doe v. Scott (the Illinois case) a similar
motion for intervention on behalf of the fetus was filed in the district court and allowed in Doe v.
Bolton. Upon a finding by the federal district court in the Doe v. Bolton case that the fetus was
not a "person," the district court noted in a footnote that it "does not postulate the existence of a
new being with federal constitutional rights at any time during gestation." 319 F. Supp. at 1055
n.3. The guardian was thus dismissed from the lawsuit. For reasons unknown, this dismissal was
not appealed by the guardian ad litem and consequently the fetus's interests were not represented
before the Supreme Court in either the Roe or Bolton cases.
50. Briefs Amici Curiae, 3 L. REPRINTS, CRIM. L. SERIES 479 (No. 37B, 1971-72).
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case (Doe v. Scott)5' with the Texas (Roe) and Georgia (Doe) cases.
This motion was also denied. 2 As a result, the fetus, not having been
represented in the crucial hearings before the justices, never enjoyed his
"day in court." 3
The Supreme Court had every opportunity to hear arguments
presented by the representative of the fetus that it was a "constitutional
person." However, the Court chose not to take advantage of this occasion.
Before the Supreme Court on October 11, 1972, Texas argued that
a fetus is a person, but quickly backed away from the logic of this position, arguing instead that the abortion problem can "be best decided by
a legislature."5 4 A legislative solution is in the best interests of the state
since it maximizes state authority. The legislature, however, has never
been permitted in Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine who is
and who is not entitled to enjoy fundamental constitutional rights.
Thus, in the end, Texas argued to enhance its authority and interests,
not fetal rights.
One should not lightly conclude from the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that the concept of "person" has no prenatal significance,
that the unborn was not, after all, entitled to a "day in court." Such a
conclusion assumes the outcome. Furthermore, it would be sound only
if one is willing to assume that the adversary process is not essential to
sound judicial decision-making-an assumption hardly compatible
with the common law tradition. To a great degree, judicial decisions
are made legitimately only if there is an opportunity for vigorous advocacy, an opportunity not allowed the fetus in the cases thus far in which
his right to personhood or, expressed differently, its right to even have
rights, has been adjudicated.
B.
(1)

The Supreme Court's Opinion on the Merits." The Unborn, Birth
and ConstitutionalPersonhood
The Initial Constitutional Issue Is the Scope of Constitutional
Personhood, Not "When Life Begins"
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philoso-

1971).
51. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I11.
52. 409 U.S. 817 (1972).
53. A month after the Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolion decisions were announced in January,
1973, the Supreme Court remanded the Illinois case "for further consideration in light of Roe v.
Wade." 410 U.S. at 950.
54. See generally ORAL ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT ABORTION DECISIONS (Sanctity of Life Publications, Ltd. 1976); Id. at 59.
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phy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate as to the answer."
Although the Supreme Court in Roe expressed concern about its
ability to "resolve the difficult question of when life begins,"5 6 the initial constitutional dilemma the Court faced was not the factual ques-

tion of when life begins but rather the legal question of the scope and
meaning of the concept of "person" in the fourteenth amendment, ie.,
whether the concept means living humans, individual humans, born

humans, rational humans, wanted humans, humans capable of "meaningful life,"5" any combination thereof or something else. In other
words, what does the term "person" as used in the fourteenth amendment mean? What values was it designed to protect? If, for example, it

means all individual, living human beings, which is this writer's position,58 the factual issue whether the fetus is an individual, living human
being is presented for decision. If "life" in the biological sense is irrelevant to membership in the class of constitutional persons or if birth is

an essential criterion to membership in this constitutional class, the
Court in Roe was correct, for then it need not "speculate as to the answer [of when life begins]." 59 On the other hand, if the real problem
facing the Court was a "proof problem," ie., how to prove that a fetus

has "life," simple judicial restraint should require the Court not to ex55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
56. Although Mr. Justice Blackmun emphasized his uncertainty about "when life begins," it
is difficult to determine from his opinion in Roe exactly what role this uncertainty played in the
Court's conclusion that the fetus is not a constitutional person. Clearly, his uncertainty was a
major factor in the Court's conclusion that the state's interest in unborn human life prior to viability was not compelling enough to overcome the woman's right to privacy. 410 U.S. at 162-64. As
the text at notes 117-18, infra, suggests, an attempt to avoid deciding this factual question may
explain at least in part the Court's birth requirement.
57. This was used by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163, to determine when
viability begins. More recently it was used in Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S. Ct. 675, 681 (1979),
impliedly in contradistinction to "momentary survival."
58. The ieasons for this belief are suggested throughout this paper. In general, the Bill of
Rights as well as subsequent amendments to the United States Constitution are to be understood
as setting forth as fundamental values of state certain fundamental human rights in a positive
form or as a statement of an American declaration of the rights of man, at least against the state.
The idea of human rights is based upon the notion that certain rights obtain by virtue of being
human and may be conditioned upon no other requirement. An attempt to restrict entitlement to
those rights by the creation of criteria other than mere humanness is incompatible with the idea of
"human rights;" an attempt to restrict entitlement to those rights by definition is jurisprudentially
permissible only if such definitions are totally rational and non-arbitrary. The fundamental issues, as suggested in the text accompanying this footnote, are: (i) Is the unborn human? (2) Is the
unborn living? and (3) Is the unborn an individual entity? Since the purpose of this article is
much more to expose the Supreme Court's arbitrariness in resolving the "person" issue than to
develop the writer's personal views, these views have been reduced to a footnote.
59. 410 U.S. at 159.
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clude the fetus from constitutional protection as a matter of law by
creating a birth requirement as it did in Roe but rather to leave the
ultimate question of constitutional personhood in the fetus unanswered, remand the case and ask for more "proof" on the factual question.6 °
(2)

How the Supreme Court Approached the Interpretation of
"Person" as Used in the Fourteenth Amendment

As stated by the Supreme Court and conceded by all parties, no
prior case had been found in which the United States Supreme Court
had addressed itself to the question of whether the term "person" as
used in the fourteenth amendment has prenatal application. 6' Thus,
for all practical purposes, the question was being presented for the first
time. In absence of precedent, the only legal materials with which the
Court had to work were the constitutional provisions themselves.
In Roe the Court, in interpreting the scope of "person" in the fourteenth amendment, applied in a very general sense only two of the several possible methods of construction.6 2 The Court first considered the
term "person" as used in other contexts in the Constitution and then
considered the history of abortion legislation throughout the nineteenth
century.
(a)

The Supreme Court's considerationof the use of the term
"person" in other contexts in the Constitution

In approximately 500 words Mr. Justice Blackmun discussed the
use of the term "person" in other clauses in the Constitution and concluded that the term "has application only postnatally. ' ' 63 With this
short essay he attempted to resolve the most important issue raised in
the case. A brief look at these other clauses reveals that they do not
provide an answer to the question of the scope of constitutional personhood. In the clauses mentioned by the Court, the concept of "person" was broad and undefined and the function of the specific
constitutional clause was to limit the broader class of persons for a par60. •A limited discussion of proofs presently available is included in the text accompanying
notes 137-53, infra. See also Krimmel & Foley, Abortion. An Inspection into the Nature ofHuman
Life and Potential Consequences of Legalizing its Destruction, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 725 (1977).
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157.
62. The commonly accepted approaches to the construction of legal documents very generally include interpreting the term at issue in good faith according to (1)the natural and ordinary
meaning of the term; (2) the context of the whole document in which the term is found; (3) the
historical background, including preparatory work; and (4) the function to be attributed to the
term.
63. 410 U.S. at 157.
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ticular purpose. For example, for a person to be qualified to be a representative, a senator or the President, he must be twenty-five, thirty and
thirty-five years of age, respectively. Quite obviously there are some
who are persons but do not meet these special qualifications for a particular office. The fact that a 24-year-old is not qualified for these offices suggests only that there are "persons" who are not qualified for
the House, Senate or the Presidency. The clause suggests that 24-yearolds are persons; it does not suggest when the 24-year-old became a
"person," or that he became a person at birth or at any other particular
stage of his development. An identical criticism can be made of Mr.
Justice Blackmun's apportionment clause6 4 and extradition clause65 arguments.66 Whatever significance the use of "person" in other contexts
in the Constitution has for the resolution of this problem, it seems to
argue against the Court's conclusion, since all clauses mentioned re64. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. The apportionment clause restricted those to be counted in
the census to "free persons," "exclud[ed] Indians not taxed" and included "three fifths of all other
persons." In Roe Justice Blackmun asked whether a fetus had ever been counted in a census. 410
U.S. at 157 n.53. This quip appears to have been inspired by Professor Means's law review article
entitled The Phoenix ofAbortional Freedom. Is a Penumbralor Ninth Amendment Right About to
*Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes ofa Fourteenth-CenturyCommon-Law Liberty? 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 402-03 (1971). In this article, published on the eve of the first oral arguments in Roe and with the obvious intent to influence the outcome of the abortion cases before the
Supreme Court, Professor Means attempted to deal not only with the briefs and written arguments
of the parties but with those of the amici as well. It is important to note that constitutional personhood in other contexts in the Constitution is not considered to be restricted by the use of the
term "person" in the apportionment clause or by the political compromises made at the time of
formulating the Constitution in the late eighteenth century. Whatever the clause's value, it offers
no guidance in construing the word "person" in the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
It is interesting that the apportionment clause uses the term "free persons," which suggests
that there are "persons" who are not "free." The Dred Scott decision dealt with the question of
citizenship, not personhood; see note 24, supra.
65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The extradition clause provides that a "person charged
. . . with Treason, Felony, or other crime . . . shall . . . be delivered up."

This clause also re-

stricts a broad and general class of "persons" for a particular purpose, in this case, those subject to
extradition. It does imply that there are "persons" who do not qualify for extradition; it does not
imply that those who do not qualify for extraditions are non-persons nor does it imply when this
personhood began.
66. Mr. Justice Blackmun's primary point is, to an extent, valid. Regarding most constitutional references to "persons," the concern is with postnatal matters. But does it follow that blacks
or "Indians not taxed" under seven years of age are not "persons?" A member of that class would
be given three-fifths of a count in the census (or none, in the case of the untaxed Indian); would be
too young to run for Congress, the Senate or the Presidency; and under the common law of crimes
would be incapable of committing treason, a felony, or "other crime" and thus would not be
subject to extradition. This, of course, does not reflect the present state of the law. Young blacks
and Indians, whether taxed or not, are clearly "persons" under the Constitution. The scope of
"person" in the fourteenth amendment has never been held to be limited by eighteenth century
political compromises. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's examples certainly suggest that possibility.
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strict for particular purposes a broad class of persons. These clauses do
not define "person." In any case, this approach offers nothing to support 7the Court's conclusion that "person" has only postnatal meaning.

(b)

6

The Supreme Court's use of history

i) The Supreme Court's argument concerning criminality of
abortions during the nineteenth century
Mr. Justice Blackmun observed in Roe that "throughout the major
portion of the nineteenth century prevailing legal abortion practices
were freer than they are today" 68 and was thus "persuade[d] . . .that
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not inthe word 'person,' as
69
clude the unborn.

There is reason to believe that Mr. Justice Blackmun's premise
concerning nineteenth century abortion practices is not valid. Briefly,
the following quotes should provide some insight into the accuracy of
the Supreme Court's statements about the legal status of abortion during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sir Edward
Coke wrote in 1628:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision
and dieth of the poand no murder; but if the childe be born alive,
70
tion, battery or other cause, this is murder.
The Supreme Court was fully aware of this passage 7 1 as well as a
similar one by Blackstone,72 but concluded that "[a] recent review of
the common-law precedents argues, however, that those precedents
67. In fact, a glance at section one of the fourteenth amendment itself could arguably suggest
that "person" has prenatal significance. The phrase in section one is "persons born or naturalized
in the United States . . .are citizens of the United States." Obviously, there are persons who are
not naturalized, for "naturalized" functions as an adjective which restricts the class of persons to
those who qualify for citizenship. By the same reasoning, "born" functions as an adjective, limiting the class of persons to those who qualify for citizenship. Although this argument may appear
superficial and, of course, does not preclude the possibility that the term "born" must be read
"born ... in the United States" as opposed to being born elsewhere, it does involve the use of
person in section one of the fourteenth amendment--the very provision being construed-and it
surely offers as much support for a "prenatal" construction as the Roe Court's analysis of the use
of person does for its birth requirement.

68. 410 U.S. at 158.
69. Id.

70. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (1628). Coke defined "misprision" in his INSTITUTES as a
word used to describe a misdemeanor which does not possess a specific name. Id. at 36. See also
Roe, 410 U.S. at 136.
71. See 410 U.S. at 134-36.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 135 n.25, citing I W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

HeinOnline -- 4 S. Ill. U. L.J. 13 1979

129-30.

14

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 1979

contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common law crime."'73 The Supreme Court supported
this conclusion by citing with apparent approval a 1971 law review article by abortion proponent Cyril Means who, according to Justice
Blackmun, suggested that Coke "may have intentionally mistated the

law" possibly because he had "participated as an advocate in an abortion case in 1601",7 and because of his desire to assert common law
jurisdiction over an offense traditionally an ecclesiastical crime. 5
Although it is possible that Coke was still zealously advocating his

client's case twenty-seven years later when he published his Institutes in
1628, or was attempting to play politics, this cynical explanation hardly
pinpoints why Sir William Blackstone, over a century later, repeated in
substance the views of Sir Edward Coke in his Commentaries of the
Laws of England.76 It also does not explain the following comment by
73. 410 U.S. at 135. Mr. Justice Blackmun appears again to have relied on the study of Cyril
Means, discussed at note 64, supra. Means argued that abortion during the fourteenth century
was a "liberty" and cited two cases (The Twinslayer's Case and The Abortionist's Case) in support. Means, supra note 64, at 335-50. Even if these two cases do reflect the state of the common
law during the fourteenth century (and there is good reason to believe they do not, see Destro,
Abortion and the Constitution: The Needfor a Lfe-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250,
1267-73 (1975)), it is difficult to understand how abortion could be considered a "liberty" when it
was clearly a crime and punishable as such by the ecclesiastical courts. See Means, supra note 64,
at 346-48 and note 64, supra. To draw a rough analogy, if possession of cannabis were not a
federal offense, would it follow that possession of cannabis is a "liberty?" Would possession also
be a liberty if possession were punished by our state courts? It is significant to remember that
during the fourteenth century it was commonly claimed that the law applied by the ecclesiastical
courts had been "received" by the state and thus obtained its authority by being essentially a part
of the law of England. See generally F. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND (1898). Maitland himself was not convinced that there had really been a "reception" of
canon law. See F. MAITLAND, Essay on William Lyndwood, in ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1898). Nevertheless, to the extent that everyone was subject to the canon
law, that punishment of considerable severity for its violation was inflicted, that canon law was
generally considered to be a "part" of English law, and that abortion was a "crime," it is very
difficult to understand the "liberty" argument advanced by Means. Moreover, even if abortion
were not a common law offense during the fourteenth century, the writings of Bracton (thirteenth
century), Coke (seventeenth century), Hale (seventeenth century), Blackstone (eighteenth century), and Kent (nineteenth century), all of whom believed that abortion of a quickened fetus was
a crime, were instrumental in formulating the attitudes of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment toward unborn human life. There is no indication that eighteenth and nineteenth century
America believed that the abortion of a quickened fetus was a "liberty." Both the cases and the
commentaries suggest the contrary. With respect to the issue of whether the word "person" includes the "unborn," the ideas of eighteenth and nineteenth century America are crucial, not those
of fourteenth century England. As the accompanying text points out, nineteenth century America
clearly believed that an abortion of a quickened fetus was a crime. And, as the nineteenth century
courts pointed out, the purpose of the common law offense was to protect unborn human life. See
notes 78-80, 82-85, infra, and accompanying text.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 136 n.26.
75. Id.
76. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129-30.
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Professor Perkins, a foremost authority on the common law of crimes

and uninvolved-as far as this writer is aware-in abortion polemics:
[It was a common law misdemeanor to administer any drug or
medicine or to perform an operation on a woman pregnant with a
quick child for the purpose of causing a miscarriage, and thereby
causing the child to be born dead, unless such operation was necessary to save the life of the woman. 7

This explanation also does not indicate why a Pennsylvania court in
1850 wrote: "The moment the womb is instinct with embryo life, and
gestation has begun, the crime may be perpetrated. .

.

. There was

therefore a crime at common law sufficiently set forth and charged in
the indictment. 7 8 It likewise fails to explain why at least four other
states reached identical conclusions with respect to a quickened fetus.7 9
It also is not supported by the fact that, at the time when the fourteenth
amendment was ratified in 1868, nearly every state had criminal legislation proscribing abortion."0 Exactly what Mr. Justice Blackmun
meant with his statement that "abortion practices were freer (in the
nineteenth century) than today" is unclear. If he meant that abortion

was neither criminal nor subject to penal sanction--either by statute or
at common law-he was wrong.
ii) The Supreme Court's argument concerning the purpose of
nineteenth century abortion legislation

Justice Blackmun implied that the purpose of the anti-abortion
legislation of the nineteenth century was in protecting "the woman's
health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus."'" The Court
cited a New Jersey statute, construed by an 1858 New Jersey Supreme
Court case, to support this idea. 2 The history of anti-abortion legisla77. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 1969), citing cases from Massachusetts (1845),
Iowa (1856) and New Jersey (1849). These cases reflected the state of the law in these states at the
time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868.
78. Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630, 633-34 (1850); see also State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630,
632 (1880).
79. Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274 (1856); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879);
Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849).
80. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 175-76 n.l (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. 410 U.S. at 151.
82. The case cited by the United States Supreme Court is State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112
(1858); however, the history of the law on abortion in New Jersey during the nineteenth century
actually argues against Mr. Justice Blackmun's conclusions in this regard. In State v. Cooper, 22
N.J.L. 52 (1849), the Supreme Court of New Jersey formulated the issues to be whether an attempt
to procure an abortion of an unquickened fetus with the mother's consent "be at all an offense or
not, and whether the child be in esse, so that any crime can be committed against its person." Id.
at 54. The court emphasized that an abortion of a quick child, even with the mother's consent,
was an offense at common law. In support of this, the court cited Blackstone's comment that
"[Il]ife begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."
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tion in New Jersey indicates that the United States Supreme Court misunderstood the statute.8 3 Beyond that, however, the evidence to the
contrary is quite overwhelming; this evidence clearly shows that there
was considerable concern during the nineteenth century in protecting
the fetus. The Supreme Court neglected to mention eleven decisions
expressly stating that the protection of the life of the unborn was at
84
least one of the purposes for the nineteenth century abortion statutes
Id. The court then noted that "lilt is not material whether, speaking with physiological accuracy,
life may be said to commence at the moment of quickening, or-at the moment of conception, or at
some intervening periods. In contemplation of law life commences at the moment of quickening,
at the moment when the embryo gives the first physicalproof of 1!fe, no matter when it first received it." Id. (second emphasis added). The court then concluded that the "offense of procuring
an abortion seems, by the ancient common law writers, to be treated only as an offense against
life." Id. As a result, the Cooper court held that, under the common law, if the woman consented
and the child had not quickened, there was no common law offense. The entire discussion of the
court, it must be emphasized, centered around the question of whether the abortion of an unquickened fetus could be a crime. (There was no mention made of the health of the mother by the
Cooper court.) The court then invited the legislature, "if the good of society requires that the evil
[meaning, this writer belives, no legal protection for the unquickened fetus] should be suppressed
by penal inflictions," to enact legislation. Id. at 58. "This decision," it is noted in the official
reporter, "induced the legislature to amend the criminal code, so as to make the offense in question a crime." Id.
83. The statute required that the offender intend "to cause and procure the miscarriage of the
woman then pregnant with child." State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. at 113 (emphasis added). What this
statute accomplished was to protect the unquickened child. Were the purpose merely to protect
the woman's health, the legislature would not have required that actual pregnancy be established
as a material element of the offense. It is true, as Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe, that the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Murphy stated that the purpose of the statute was "to guard the
health and life of the mother against the consequences of [attempts to procure abortions.]" 27
N.J.L. at 114. However, Mr. Justice Blackmun failed to mention (I) that an abortion of a quickened child was already a crime at common law in New Jersey; (2) that at least one effect of the
statute was to make an abortion of an unquickened child a crime in New Jersey; (3) that before
the crime could be committed, the woman must be actually pregnant with either an unquickened
or quickened child; and (4) that the inducement for enacting the statute was the holding in Cooper
in which the only "evil" discussed was the failure of the common law to provide protection of an
unquickened fetus.
84. A case expressly holding that protection of the life of the fetus is one of the purposes of
the nineteenth century abortion statutes is Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 73 So. 834 (1916),
cert. denied, 198 Ala. 695, 73 So. 1002 (1917). The Alabama Court of Appeals wrote:
[The statute's] manifest purpose is to restrain after conception an unwarranted interference with the course of nature in the propagation and reproduction of human kind. ...
We are forced to concede that when in the red-hot furnace of vitality two germs, male
and female, are brought together, that fuse themselves into one, a new being, crowned
with humanity and mentality, comes into life. If this be true, does not the new being,
from the first day of its uterine life, acquire a legal and moral status that entitles it to the
same protection as that guaranteed to human beings in extrauterine life . . . ?
Id. at 486, 73 So. at 836.
According to the Kansas Comp. Laws of 1879, abortion of a quick fetus was manslaughter
(Comp. Laws 1879, c. 31, p. 329) whereas an abortion of a non-quick fetus was a misdemeanor
(Comp. Laws 1879, c. 31, p. 332). In State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913), the Supreme
Court of Kansas commented on the purpose of the latter statute by writing that the statute "carries
the facial evidence of the legislative intent to cover the criminal machinations and devices of the
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and that nine others implied the same notion. s5
The Court also failed to mention Blackstone's famous statement
that "Life is. . . a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it
begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb.86 Blackstone's first American editions appeared in
1771 and have helped explain the attitude of nineteenth century
America towards unborn life. According to Harvard Law Professor
Charles Haar:
Blackstone supplied a real need in this country. Without a trained
bar, lacking a tradition of learning and of legal education, America
found his exposition overwhelming in force. It is powerful and direct. Its emphasis on natural law fitted in with the peculiar environment of law in America. Because of the Commentaries English
common law became also the common law of the United States. To
the link of the common language was added that of the common
legal principles. The Commentaries were a conduit of the ideas of
Locke and Montesquieu to the framers of the Federal and state constitutions. They attained the position of an oracle of law on which
was
lawyers for generations cut their teeth; mastery of Blackstone
87
deemed an adequate preparation for the practice of law.
abortionist in order to protect the pregnant woman and the unborn child." See Dougherty v.
People, I Colo. 514 (1872); Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); State v. Alcorn, 7
Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901); State v. Watson, 30 Kan. 281, 1 P. 770 (1883); Joy v. Brown, 173
Kan. 833, 252 P.2d 889 (1933); State v. Gedlicke, 43 N.J.L. 86 (1881); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J.
249, 121 A.2d 490, 494 (1956); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913); Bowlan v.
Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 54 P.2d 666 (1936); State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 167 P. 1019 (1917);
State v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380 (1859); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.E.2d 72 (1950);
State v. Cox, 197 Wash. 67, 84 P.2d 357 (1938).
85. Abrams v. Forbee, 3 Iowa 273 (1856); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128 (1866); Smith v. State,
33 Me. 48 (1851); Worthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 48 A. 355 (1901); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich.
594, 26 N.W. 291 (1886); Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881); Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251,
112 N.W. 611 (1907); Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. St. 630 (1850); State v. Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091 (1898). See generaly Horan,
Gorby & Hilgers, Abortion and The Supreme Court.- Death Becomes a Way of Life, in ABORTION
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1972).
86. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129. See State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849), for an
example of how the New Jersey Supreme Court used this passage by Blackstone to determine the
scope of the common law crime of abortion.
87. Haar, Preface to W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1962) at
xxii-xxiii. An example of the influence of Blackstone on the thinking of Americans just prior to
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 can be found in the following statement by
Abraham Lincoln: "The more I read [of Blackstone's Commentaries], the more intensely interested I became. Never in my whole life was my mind so thoroughly absorbed. I read until I
devoured them." Id. Cf. Bedau, The Right to Lie, 52 THE MONIST 550 (1968). An example of
Blackstone's influence on the attitude of the judiciary to unborn human life is also reflected in an
1820 Mississippi case in which the court held that a slave was a person under the criminal law and
entitled to its protections and that a slave owner could be prosecuted for the murder of his slave.
The court wrote:
The taking away of the life of a reasonable creature under the King's peace, with malice
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A brief look at the law books used by nineteenth century law students
testifies to the influence of Blackstone on nineteenth century thought.

It was common for a law professor to make at least one of his contributions to legal education, and to the development of the law, by editing

and commenting upon Blackstone.8" Furthermore, Blackstone and

Kent, who echoed Blackstone's words, 89 were cited as authority by
those who sponsored the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well as the fourteenth amendment.9 0 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is of considerable

importance to this study since, as Professor Berger points out in his
Government by Judiciary,the "key to [the] meaning [of the privileges or
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment] is furnished by the
immediately preceding Civil Rights Act of 1866, which, all are agreed,

it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] [a]mendment to embody and protect." 9 '

The development of nineteenth century medical ethics seems to
parallel the legal principles of Blackstone. Very influential during the
early nineteenth century was Thomas Percival's Medical Ethics in
which the following was written: "To extinguish the first spark of life is

a crime of the same nature, both against our maker and society, as to

destroy an infant, a child, or a man. '"92 These views explain in part the

by the
condemnation of abortion as the destruction of "human life"
93
American Medical Association at its 1859 annual meeting.
Further support for the idea that nineteenth century America was
concerned with preserving the life of the fetus is ironically found in
Botsford v. Union Pacific Railroad,94 the very case which the Supreme
Court cited in Roe as its landmark right to privacy case. Although the

Botsford Court acknowledged a common law right to privacy which
aforethought, express or implied, is murder at common law. Is not the slave a reasonable
creature, is he not a human being, and the meaning of this phrase reasonable creature is
a human being, for the killing a lunatic, an idiot, or even a child unborn, is murder, as
much as the killing a philosopher, and has not the slave as much reason as a lunatic, an
idiot or an unborn child.
State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (I Walker) 39 (1820) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Professor Tucker's Blackstone; Wendell's Blackstone; Professor Cooley's Blackstone; Dean Ewell's Blackstone; Blickensdorfer's Blackstone; Dean Hammond's Blackstone; Dean
Gavit's Blackstone; Dean Chase's Blackstone.
89. Kent wrote, in his COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (12th ed. 1973), as follows: "The
absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of
personal property, the right to enjoy and acquire property. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable."
90.

See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20-22 (1977).

91. Id. at 20.
92. T. PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS 134-35 (Leake ed. 1827).
93. Minutes of the Annual Meeting 1859, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL GAZETTE 409 (1859).
94. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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precluded a court without statutory authority from ordering a medical
examination of a female plaintiff in a personal injury case, 95 it pointed
out that one of two exceptions to this common law right of privacy was
the writ de ventre inspiciendo. With this writ, the state was empowered
to examine whether a woman convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to be executed was quick with child, thus overcoming her right
to privacy. If she was, execution would be stayed until after the birth of

the child. Here, the common law not only acknowledged a right to life
in the fetus but also recognized precedence of this right over the common law right of privacy.
In light of the above it seems hard to suggest-as did the majority
in Roe-that the concerns of the nineteenth century were exclusively
about the pregnant woman and not the unborn, and difficult to argue-

as did the majority in Roe-that the purpose of nineteenth century
abortion legislation was in protecting "the woman's health rather than
in preserving the embryo and fetus." Indeed, the preservation of the
fetus appears to have been a major purpose. Moreover, even those
courts which have indicated that preservation of maternal health was a
purpose for enacting the anti-abortion statute did so against a back-

ground in which abortion of at least a quickened fetus was considered a
common law crime.9 6
If Justice Blackmun meant that an unquickened fetus may not

have enjoyed protection under the common law, he should have said
that. The correlation, however, would be that the quickened fetus did

enjoy criminal law protection, a fact which argues against the Court's
conclusion that constitutional personhood has no prenatal application.9 7
95. Elevating a common law right to a constitutional right, as did the Supreme Court in Roe
with the right to privacy, raises an additional point. In Botsford the Supreme Court simply asked
whether it had the authority to order an examination of the woman without statutory authority
and concluded it did not. The implication, of course, is that with statutory authority, the Court
would be so empowered. In short, the Court recognized the predominance of statutory law over
common law. Indeed, subsequent to Botsford, nearly every state, either by statute or court rule,
had permitted a court to order physical examinations of injured plaintiffs in personal inijury cases.
Thus, the right to privacy in this context has given way to a legislatively determined greater need.
By elevating the right to a constitutional level, the legislature loses, except under compelling circumstances, the power to limit the right. Botsford thus may stand for the notion that there is a
common law right to privacy. It does not, however, stand for the notion that this right prevails
over any legislative determinations that the right must yield to what it considers to be more important values, such as was the case with the criminal abortion laws.
96. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
noted that the common law "offense [of abortion] was only against the life of the child."
97. Quickening refers to the mother's awareness of the movement of the fetus in the womb; it
thus reflects maternal sensitivity, not fetal competence, and thus also tends to be an arbitrary point
at which to commence constitutional personhood. One possible reason why "quickening" may
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In oral argument before the Roe court98 as well as in the Roe majority opinion, 99 the Supreme Court seemed impressed by the historical
fact that no case had been found in which the pregnant woman was
prosecuted for allowing an abortion to be performed on herself and by
the fact that the punishment for conviction under the abortion statutes
was much milder than the punishment for homicide. The Court found
this to suggest that the fetus was not considered a person, as was the
victim in a homicide. Such a conclusion is simply not warranted since
there are other valid explanations. For example, if a 12-year-old intentionally kills a born individual in Illinois, no crime has been committed
since the child is not legally responsible. No one could suggest that the
victim of the act was not a person because the killer was not or could
not be prosecuted. If a 15-year-old intentionally kills another, but is
proceeded against under the Juvenile Court Act, one could hardly argue that the victim is not a person. The explanation for this legal phenomenon is that there are special circumstances surrounding the
commitment of an act, circumstances which the lawmaker may properly and reasonably consider in formulating means to protect state interests and values-in the examples given, the age and assumed
immaturity of the actor; in the abortion situation, the assumed stresses
on the woman burdened by an unwanted pregnancy. These factors
may justify and explain different treatment of the woman or even the
physician in the abortion context, just as they justify or explain different treatment of the child of tender years or even of one who kills another under severe provocation.
Although in modem jurisprudence constitutional history alone has
not been allowed to dispose of every question of constitutional interpretation, this brief historical background casts doubt on the soundness
of two of the Supreme Court's critical conclusions in Roe v. Wade: (1)
that abortion was not considered a crime by most of those who supported the fourteenth amendment in 1868;' °° and (2) that the purpose
of the anti-abortion laws was solely to protect the woman's health and
not the life of the fetus. In addition, it casts doubt on the Court's holdhave been important in criminal law is because at that point it would be possible through the
mother's testimony or by reports of a mother's statements to determine if the fetus were in fact
alive at the time of the infliction of the criminal act. With such testimony, one could establish the
corpus delecti of the crime. See note 82, supra, for a discussion of State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52
(1849). As the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cooper points out, quickening is important in law
because "at that moment the embryo gives the first proof of life." 22 N.J.L. at 54.
98. ORAL ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT ABORTION DECISIONS (Sanctity of Life Publications, Ltd. 1976) at 20, 28, 54, 61-62.
99. 410 U.S. at 138, 151.
100. It should be noted that the legislatures which ratified the fourteenth amendment also,
within the same general time frame, enacted the abortion statutes of the nineteenth century.
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ing that the concept of "person" does not embrace the unborn. The

effect of this doubt surely is to augment the obligations of the Supreme
Court to account for a requirement of birth as a condition precedent for
membership in the class of constitutional persons.
(3)

The Supreme Court Concluded that Constitutional Personhood
Begins at Birth

Based upon the Court's conclusions concerning the postnatal use
of "person" in the fourteenth amendment and upon its understanding

of the history of the criminality of abortions, the Court implied, al-

though did not explicitly state,' 0 that birth is the point at which consti-

tutional personhood begins. This conclusion becomes apparent from
several other statements made in the opinion. Only one of these statements, however, will be discussed. According to the Roe opinion, the

legal value of the unborn is, prior to viability, insignificant-if it exists
at all-when it conflicts with a woman's right to privacy, which the
Supreme Court in Roe found "includes the abortion decision."°102 Nevertheless, after viability, the state has an "important and legitimate interest in potential life."' 0 3 This pronouncement means that any legal

protection for the life of the unborn after viability depends upon
whether the state "chooses" to assert its interest in protecting fetal
life." ° In other words, the existence of legal protection for the fetus at
101. Was the Court's failure to explicitly state that constitutional personhood begins at birth
intentional? Although this paper proceeds on the assumption that constitutional personhood begins at birth, is it possible that in the minds of the justices there are perhaps additional conditions
precedent to obtaining constitutional personhood? Can some indication of this be found in the
Court's statement that the state's compelling interest in protecting the unborn begins at viability
because then the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb?" 410
U.S. at 163. What does "meaningful life" mean? That life is possible outside the mother's womb?
That there is potential for survival? Or does it suggest something entirely different, something
related, for example, to intellectual ability, financial ability, physical ability, to the capability of
being happy, normal, loyal, healthy, or perhaps to the state of being wanted or loved or to whether
a "meaningful" contribution to society can be made? Interestingly enough, since Roe, and likely
as a consequence of Roe, serious suggestions have been made to postpone legal protections until
even beyond birth. See, e.g., Nobel Prize Winner James Watson's statement that "most birth
defects are not discovered until birth. . . . [If] a child were not declared alive until three days
after birth, all parents could be allowed the choice [to preserve the child's life] that only a few are
given under the present system." Watson, Children from the Laboratory, PRISM, May 1973, at 1213. See also Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 37, 44 (1972), where the
author suggests that an "organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and belives that it is itself
such a continuing entity;" Horan, Euthanasia as Medical Management, in DEATH, DYING AND
EUTHANASIA 198-99 (D. Horan & D. Mall ed. 1977) for a discussion of several other similar
suggestions.
102. 410 U.S. at 154.
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id.
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this stage of human development depends upon the mercy or interests
of the state, not upon any notion of an inherent, inalienable right to life

or upon a corresponding duty incumbent upon the state to protect such

rights.' O5 Thus, unless the Court had assumed that constitutional per-

sonhood begins at birth, this decision marks a radical departure from
the liberal political philosophy of which the Constitution is a manifestation.106 Surely the Court did not intend to suggest that the right to
life of a person depends upon whether the state finds it worthwhile or
expedient to allow that person to live. Assuming no far-reaching disavowal of the fundamental liberal tradition, one must conclude that the
Court decided for all practical purposes that birth is a constitutional

requirement for membership in the class of constitutional "persons."
(4) Two Approaches the Supreme Court Did Not Use in
Interpreting "Person:" The Plain Meaning of the Term

and the Function of the Term
A primary and certainly a very common method of construing a
document is to give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. °7
A study of two of the most complete and authoritative dictionaries in
the English language, The Oxford English Dictionaryof 1970 and Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary,as well as the 1828 and 1865
editions of Daniel Webster's An American Dictionary of the English

Language, are illuminating. All relevant definitions define "person" in
terms of humanness, individual humanness, and the state of being a
105. Professor Verdross suggests that the state has a duty to create courts to protect fundamental human rights. See A. Verdross, The Idea of Fundamental Human Rights (translated by this
author and set for publication in 1979).
106. See, e.g., Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928).
107. Although the history of constitutional decision-making suggests that the "plain meaning"
approach is only one of numerous methods of interpretation, this principle of interpreting according to the literal meaning has been frequently applied by constitutional courts. In Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977), the Court wrote: "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." See also E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 315
(1940), where he wrote: "[Tihe intention of the legislature is to be primarily ascertained from the
language used in the statute, and if the language is plain and unambiguous, it must be given a
literal meaning." See also Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889), where the Court
wrote:
If the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of the other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the
instrument, must be accepted, and neither the courts nor the legislature have the right to
add to it or take from it.
Even though scholars look upon the "plain meaning" approach as a relatively unsophisticated one
and as one which distracts a person from the more important analysis of function and history, the
Court has not hesitated to use "plain meaning" as an approach to construction, particularly when
it serves its purposes. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 444.
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8 "Human" is defined in these dictionaries in terms of
human1 being.'°
"man." 9 And "man" is defined in terms of "humanness" or in terms

of individual membership in the human race." l0 Thus, the circle of
definitions is complete. Neither the word "birth" nor anything relating
to birth is mentioned, either directly or indirectly, in any of the numer-

ous and varying definitions of "person," "human" or "human being,"
or "man." It is therefore understandable why the Court did not pursue
the "ordinary usage" or "plain meaning" path to interpretation; nothing in these definitions state, mention, suggest or even imply that birth
108. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1970) provides the following relevant definitions of
"person:" "II. An individual human being; a man, woman, or child; IV. Law. A human being
(naturalperson)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY provides these relevant
definitions: "I. a) an individual human being; c) a human being as distinguished from an
animal or thing; 8. a being characterized by conscious apprehension, rationality, and a moral
... Noah Webster's AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
sense; 9. a living individual unit.
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) provided the following pertinent definitions of "person:" "I. An
individual human being consisting of body and soul. We apply the word to living beings only,
possessed of a rational value; the body when dead is not called a person. It is applied alike to a
man, woman or child. 'A person is a thinking intelligent being' - Locke; 2. A man, woman or
child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them; 3. A human being, indefinitely;
one; a man." The 1865 version of Noah Webster's AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE defined "person" as follows: "3. The corporeal manifestation of a soul; the outward
appearance, expression, & c., body; 4. A living soul; a self-conscious being; a moral agent; especially a living human being; a man, woman, or child; an individual of the human race. 'We must
consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.' Locke; 5. A human being spoken of indefinitely; one; a man."
109. Since most of the definitions use the term "human" or "human being" to define "person,"
the possibly relevant definitions of "human" are given. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1970) defines "human" as "I. Of, belonging to, or characteristic of man; 2. Of the nature of
" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY defines "human" as "I. a) of
man ..
or relating to man: characteristic of man; 3. characteristic of or relating to man in his essential
" In AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) Webster denature ..
fined "human being" as follows: "1. Belonging to man or mankind; pertaining or relating to the
race of man; 2. Having the qualities of a man." The 1865 version defined "human" as follows:
"I. Belonging to man or mankind; having the qualities or attributes of a man; pertaining or
relating to the race of man; 2. A human being; one of the race of man."
110. Since "human" is often defined in terms of "man," relevant definitions of "man" are
provided. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1970): "I. I. A human being (irrespective of sex
" WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY: "I. a) A member of the
or age) ..
human race; a human being; 2. b) A bipedal primate mammal (homo sapiens) . . . distinguished by notable development of the brain with a resultant capacity of articulate speech and
abstract reasoning, marked erectness of body carriage...; 2. c) Individual; one." In AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) Webster defined "man" as follows:
"I. Mankind; the human race; the whole species of human beings; beings distinguished from all
other animals by the powers of reason and speech, as well as by their shape and dignified aspect;
7. An individual of the human species." The 1865 version defined "man" as follows: "1. An
individual of the human race; a human being; a person; 3. The human race; mankind; the totality of man."
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is part of, related to, or a condition precedent to personhood. In short,
it offers no support for its birth requirement for personhood.
Concerning the function. of the fourteenth amendment and the role
of the word "person" in the amendment, it can be said that the immediate political concern of the second half of the 1860s was to secure rights
and freedoms and to ensure equal protection for former slaves."I
More generally, however, the amendment was designed to secure to all
persons the fundamental rights of man, which generally include life,
liberty or property, by providing the adjective right of access to the
courts. 1 2 There is nothing in the function of the fourteenth amendment to suggest that itsscope or purpose is to protect only the born.
And to the extent that an unborn can be the owner of property' 13 and is
living, 14" a fourteenth amendment purpose exists in the case of the unborn just as surely as it does with a born person who owns property and
possesses "life."' "'

IV.

THE BIRTH REQUIREMENT, AVOIDANCE OF THE "LIFE" ISSUE,
JUDICIAL SCIENCE AND ARBITRARINESS

There is nothing in the Constitution itself or in its history which
even suggests-to say nothing about requires-that constitutional personhood begins at birth. If anything, the contrary is true. Most probably the term indicates and was understood to mean an individual
human being' ' 6 -a classification for which birth does not appear to be
a criterion. Are there perhaps other rational factors not directly related
to the Constitution or its history which would justify the Court's reaching beyond the strict realm of positive jurisprudence and creating a
birth requirement as an essential requisite for membership in the class
of constitutional persons?
Ill.

See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT

BY JUDICIARY (1977).
112. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20 (1977).

113. See notes 100 and 101, supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 127-36 and 137-53, infra.
115. Since there are no judicial decisions on the matter, one can only speculate about how the
Supreme Court would deal with an attempt by a state to deprive the unborn of his property
without due process of law or just compensation.
116. See notes 108-10, supra, and accompanying text; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 893 (1977). He writes: "Human beings are of course the intended beneficiaries of
our constitutional scheme." See also Destro, Abortion and the Constitution.- The Needfor a LifeProtective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975).
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A.

By Selecting Birth as an EssentialRequisite of Constitutional
Personhoodthe Supreme Court Evaded the 'Life" Issue

Quoted earlier was a statement by Mr. Justice Blackmun to the
effect that the judiciary should not speculate as to "when life begins"
when philosophers, theologians and physicians themselves cannot, he
claims, arrive at a consensus." '7 By grafting a birth requirement upon
the concept of constitutional personhood, the Supreme Court hoped to

avoid the necessity of making a judicial determination of "when life
begins.""'

8

Is a Court justified in selecting an essentially arbitrary fac-

tor as a requisite to constitutional personhood to avoid the dilemma of
deciding "when life begins," a quandry which, according to Mr. Justice
Blackmun, philosophers, theologians and even physicians cannot resolve?
B.

The Principles of Legal Science Do Not Require the Supreme
Court to A void the "'Lfe"Issue
(1)

Justice Holmes's Dissent in Lochner and the "Life" Issue

Perhaps the Court's reluctance to "speculate" about "when life be-

gins" results from its expressed desire to follow "Mr. Justice Holmes's
admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York" ' "19

that the individual opinions of the justices "ought not to conclude [the
Court's] judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution."' t2 0 What Justice Holmes seems to have

said is that the justices should not sit as superlegislators and declare
statutes unconstitutional which they do not like. He was not suggesting
117. Quoted in text accompanying note 55, supra.
118. It is interesting to note in this regard that in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the
Supreme Court in discussing the existence and legitimacy of a state interest in encouraging birth,
as opposed to abortion, once again avoided decision on the "life" issue. In Maher the Court
finessed the issue by concluding that the state had an interest in "potential human life," thus
making a decision about the existence of life at a particular stage unnecessary in the context of
asserting state interests. 432 U.S. at 478-80.
119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117; see note 9, supra, for the full text of the quotation.
120. Id. Justice Holmes's argument is applicable to a similar argument made by proponents of
abortion in the numerous debates on the topic. For example, at the 1975 Pierce Debates at the
University of Chicago, Sybella Fritzsche, for the pro-abortion side, said:
I do not believe that nine wisemen in Washington hold the truth. In our society, there is
not necessarily one common binding standard for all of us, and I think the Court paid
attention to that fact. They admitted that there was no absolute Truth that they could
find.
The Chicago Maroon, Apr. 29, 1975. The weakness of this argument is that "in our society there
...is one common binding standard for all of us," and that standard is the Constitution. Otherwise, our society would face the problem of the tyranny of the majority. Moreover, the "nine
wisemen in Washington," not theologians, physicians or even the majority of the American people, are charged with its interpretation or the responsibility of determining its meaning and scope.
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that judges should hesitate to discharge their responsibility as judges,
even if this involves making difficult, and often unpopular, legal and
factual determinations. After all, constitutional provisions have a legal
meaning and scope regardless of what the various schools of philosophy and theology may think or even what the majority of people in a
democracy thinks. Indeed, a primary purpose of a catalogue of fundamental human rights, such as the Bill of Rights, in a constitutional document is to protect those fundamental rights from the whims,
predispositions or excesses of those who administer the state-and
from a possible tyranny of the majority. And it is certainly the judges'
responsibility to conscientiously construe those constitutional provisions. Were this not so, the predispositions or whims of administrators
of state, whether executive or judicial, or the building of a majority
consensus that, for example, "blacks" were not "citizens" as in Dred
Scott, 2 or that non-Aryans were not full persons as in Nazi Germany,
would be dispositive of the question of whether individual members of
these minority groups are entitled to protection under the "person"
concept of the Constitution. Such a solution would rub against the
grain of the entire human rights movement-a movement based on the
idea that there are certain fundamental rights which ought to exist by
virtue of being a living human being and for no other reason22-as
well as against the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. 23 Mr. Justice Holmes did not express a contrary idea in Lochner. In fact, in the
paragraph following the one in Lochner quoted by Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
I think that the word "liberty," in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
have been understood by the traditions of our peoprinciples as they124
law.
our
and
ple
In spite of its promise to bear Holmes's famous dissent in mind, the
Roe Court struck down a statute which was the "natural outcome of a
121. See note 24, supra.
122. See A. Verdross, The Idea of Fundamental Human Rights (translated by this author and
set for publication in 1979), particularly his discussion of the contribution of Samual Pufendorf.
123. Appellants in Roe argued that "whether the fetus is or is not a human being is a matter of
definition, not fact, and we can define it in any way we wish." Brief for Appellant at 119, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972). If appellants are correct in their claim, the existence of human rights
would be dependent upon the whims of the entity empowered to define "human." Moreover, the
pro-abortionist claim that abortional freedom is a victory for human rights accordingly rests on a
most fickle basis.
124. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 78 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dominant opinion," 125 that is, the product of the democratic process.
But what is more important, the Texas abortion statute actually implemented, rather than infringed, "fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."'' 26 Mr.
Justice Holmes's admonition in Lochner, unheeded in Roe, simply
means that the Constitution should be construed according to fundamental legal principles, not the personal predilection of judges.
(2) The Judiciary and the "Life" Issue in Non-Abortion Cases
The Court implied in the statement concerning the question of
"when life begins127 that it would be improper for the judiciary to
speculate as to the answer to such an inquiry. It is noteworthy that the
125. Id.
126. Id. See generally text accompanying notes 55-115, supra. The fact that the Roe case has
had ramifications beyond its direct impact on criminal abortion statutes into such areas as a father's interests in his unborn child and parents' authority to control the moral development of
their minor children (see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975); Baird v.
Bellotti, 428 U.S. 132 (1975); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. 111.1978), appealdismissed,
direct appealimproper, 99 S. Ct. 49 (1978), appealdocketed, No. 78-1262 (7th Cir. 1978)) suggests
again, although indirectly, that the decision was contrary to the "fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." At the time of the enactment
of the fourteenth amendment, fathers were generally entitled to custody of children following
divorce. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (pt. IV) 205 (12th ed. 1973). Yet Roe and
Danforth state that the father cannot even prevent the destruction of his unborn child. Nevertheless, parents have both the duty and the right to maintain and educate their children. To support
this idea Kent noted the following:
(c) In the case of The Commonwealth v. Armstrong, in the session of the peace of
Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, in 1842, Mr. Justice Lewis, the president judge, decided, after a learned examination of the subject, that a minister of the gospel had no
right, contrary to the express commands of the father, to receive an infant daughter,
under the immediate guardianship of the father, from the church to which the father
belonged, and in which the child was baptized and instructed, and initiate it, by baptism,
into another church of a different denomination. It was held to be the right and the duty
of the father, not only to maintain his infant children, but to instruct their minds in
moral and religious principles, and to regulate their consciences by a course of education
and discipline. All interference with the parental power and duty, except by the courts of
justice, when that power is abused, is injurious to domestic subordination, and to the
public peace, morals, and security. Parents, says a distinguished jurist on natural law,
have the right by the law of nature to direct the actions of their children, as being a
power necessary to their proper education. It is the will of God, therefore, that parents
should have and exercise that power. Nay, he observes, parents have the right to direct
their children to embrace the religion which they themselves approve.
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (pt. IV) 203 (12th ed. 1973).
Roe, Danforth and perhaps Bellotti suggest that the exercise of such control over a minor
child's decision to abort is unconstitutional. Does the child's right to privacy also include a right
to engage in sexual relations without interference of the parents or the state? To marry at a tender
age without consent of parents or court? Does it suggest, for example, that all statutory rape laws
are unconstitutional? (Statutory rape laws certainly have a "chilling effect" on the minor's access
to the adult population for sexual gratification.) Such possibilities for the right of privacy certainly suggest an inconsistency with fundamentals long "understood by the traditions of our people and our law."
127. See text accompanying note 55, supra, for the full text of the quotation.
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Federal Constitutional Court of Western Germany, a court which enjoys the power of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutory
enactments 28 and which occupies in the German political structure a
position comparable to the United States Supreme Court, did not feel
so inadequate when faced with the question whether the constitutional
provision "Jeder hat das Recht auf Leben" (Everyone has the right to
life) includes the unborn. In striking down a statute which allowed
abortion on demand during the first trimester of pregnancy after the
mother had undergone counseling, the German Constitutional Court
wrote:
In construing Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic
Law, one should begin with its language: "Everyone has the right to
life .

. . ."

Life, in the sense of historical existence of a human indi-

vidual, exists according to definite biological-physiological knowledge, in any case, from the 14th day after conception (nidation,
individuation) . .

.

. The process of development which has begun

at that point is a continuing process which exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise division of the various steps of
development of the human life. The process does not end even with
birth; the phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the
human personality, for example, appear for the first time a rather
long time after birth. Therefore the protection of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the
"completed" human being after birth or to the child about to be born
which is independently capable of living. The right to life is guaranteed to everyone who "lives;" no distinction can be made here between various stages of the life developing itself before birth, or
between unborn and born life. "Everyone" in the sense of Article 2,
Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law is "everyone living;" expressed in another way: every life possessing human individuality;
"everyone" also includes the yet unborn human being. 129
The sense of judicial humbleness expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Roe has prevented neither the English courts from
deciding in a will construction case that "an infant en ventre sa mere [in
its mother's womb], who by the course and order of nature is then living, comes clearly within the description of 'children living at the time
of his decease' ",130 nor the American courts from reaching similar conclusions. 3 1 It has not prevented the courts from allowing recoveries in
128. Under Article 93 of the Basic Law, which is the West German Constitution, and under
Sections 13, 31 and 95 of the Statute of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Constitutional Court has the power to rule on the constitutionality of statutes and declare unconstitutional
statutes null and void.
129. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 29, at 638.
130. Doe v. Clarke, 2 H.Bl. 399, 400, 126 Eng. Rep. 617, 618 (1795).
131. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Laws, 30 Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922).

HeinOnline -- 4 S. Ill. U. L.J. 28 1979

No. I1]

"Right" to an Abortion

tort for prenatal injuries as did the California District Court of Appeal
when it noted:
The respondent asserts that the provisions of Section 29 of the
Civil Code are based on a fiction of law to the effect that an unborn
child is a human being separate and distinct from its mother. We
think that assumption of our statute is not a fiction, but on the contrary that it is an established and recognized fact by science and by
everyone of understanding.132
It did not discourage the Illinois Supreme Court in a wrongful death
case in which the fetus was born dead from quoting with approval the
following from a New York case:
To hold, as a matter of law, that no viable fetus has any separate
existence which the law will recognize is for the law to deny a simple
and easily demonstrable fact. This child, when injured, was in fact,
alive and capable 33of being delivered and of remaining alive, separate
from its mother.'
Nor did it discourage the Illinois Supreme Court in that case from allowing a wrongful death recovery, as have the majority of state
supreme courts which have ruled upon the question of the scope of
"person" in wrongful death statutes. 134 It also did not discourage the
State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, or the State's Attorney of
Will County, Illinois, from requesting that the Grand Jury return a
murder indictment for the killing of a viable but unborn child.'3 5 In
fact, the Grand Jury in the Cook County case was instructed by the
State's Attorney to return a true bill only if it made a finding that the
fetus was alive at the time it was shot, and died as a result of the shooting. Based upon the testimony of a pathologist, a true bill for murder
36
was returned. 1
In short, in areas not so politically volatile as abortion, the judiciary has not hesitated to take notice of, to consider and to hold that
"life" exists before birth. In fact, Roe is actually unique, representing
132.

Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).

133. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 372-73, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1973), quoting
Woods v. Loncet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
134. See cases cited in Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d at 370-71, 304 N.E.2d at 8990.
135. In the Cook County case of People v. Melvin Morgan (1975), as well as in a more recent
Will County, Illinois, case (1978), the defendant was found not guilty because of the failure of the
state to prove that the defendant caused the killing. Statement of Mr. Ralph Berkowitz, First
Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, Spring 1975. But cf.Mr. Justice Douglas's
concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton in which he quoted from Mr. Justice Clark as follows: "No

prosecutor has ever returned a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of a fetus." 410
U.S. at 218.
136. Statement of Mr. Ralph Berkowitz, First Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, Spring 1975.
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one of the few instances in which a court has refused to take cognizance
of established scientific data concerning the nature of the unborn
human being.
C.

One of the Consequences of the Birth Requirement Is That the
Nature of the Fetus as Viewed by Science Becomes
Irrelevant

Regarding the nature of the unborn as viewed by science and his
qualifications for constitutional personhood, the Supreme Court in Roe
merely acknowledged its awareness of the "well-known facts of fetal
development." 137 Under the dictates of the logic of the Court's birth
requirement, the Supreme Court apparently felt that mere acknowlegment sufficed, and this was perhaps mentioned only to resolve any
doubt one might entertain concerning the Court's awareness of these
facts. The problem is, however, that the essential characteristics of man
as viewed by science, characteristics which may show that the fetus is
not, in any important aspect, essentially different from an infant, have
become constitutionally irrelevant. Some of the more striking of these
characteristics are reviewed below.
(1)

Individuality' 38

The "individuality" of corporations played a primary role in the
Supreme Court's holding that corporations were "persons" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment 39 and was specifically emphasized in the West German Constitutional Court's decision that "everyone" in the Basic Law means "every life possessing human
individuality."' 4 ° Accordingly, one would think that the United States
Supreme Court, presumably desirous of basing its decisions on the results and logic of scientific inquiry and rational assessment of those
results, would be interested in the scientific facts that the unborn is a
genetically unique individual from the moment conception is com137. 410 U.S. at 156.
138. Professor Richard Stith develops a similar idea in his article entitled The World as
Reality, as Resource and as a Pretense, 20 AM. J. JURIS. 141 (1975). He notes that "all individual
life (not just human life) is distinguishable from inanimate matter (and from other nearby life)
primarily in having separate systemic autonomy, a capacity to regulate and direct its own
equilibrium rather than being entirely subject to external forces. Since conception is the point at
which that autonomous system begins which we are until our deaths, our conceptional origin
seems obvious." Id. at 142. Stith then cites Finnis and his article on The Rights and Wrongs of
Abortion, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS 117, 144-45 (1973) for an "excellent rendition of approximately
this argument."
139. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1889).
140. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 29, at 638.
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pleted, 4 ' has an individual circulatory system, 142 is psychologically individual,' 43 and is very largely in charge of the pregnancy while the
mother is merely a passive carrier. 14 However, the Supreme Court's
birth requirement attempts to render these facts, universally accepted
as such by the scientific community, legally irrelevant.
'45
(2) "Cogito, ergo sum'

If this classic idea of the rational nature of man were the key to
fourteenth amendment personhood, 146 the Court should be interested

to know that electroencephalographic waves have been detected from
the brains of 43- to 45-day old fetuses and that conscious experience is
possible soon after that date; 147 that the human fetus develops consciousness and self-awareness at approximately the twenty-eighth week

of pregnancy;14 and that the unborn hears and recognizes his mother's
voice before birth. 149 One might also wonder why the American Bar
Association's carefully worked out definition of death ("irreversible
141. Theodosins Dobzhansky wrote the following about the "genotype" of each individual:
Every human being has, then, his own nature, individual and nonrepeatable. The
nature of man as a species resolves itself into a great multitude of human natures. Everyone is born with a nature that is absolutely new in the universe, that will never appear
again (identical twins and other identical multiple births, of course, excepted).
T. DOBZHANSKY, HEREDITY AND NATURE OF MAN 37 (1966).
142. Heffernan, The Early Biography of Everyman, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (D.
Horan & T. Hilgers ed. 1972).
143. A. GESELL, THE EMBRYOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 172 (1945).
144. Liley, The Fetus in Control ofHis Environment in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 27 (D.
Horan & T. Hilgers ed. 1972).
145. "I think, therefore I am." R. DESCARTES, DiscoURS DE LA METHODE (2d ed. 1962).
Rene Descartes's (1596-1650) self-evident proposition or axiom upon which he develops his
philosophy is to a large extent a classical formula, derived in part from St. Augustine, (See M.
WEBER, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 309 (1899)), but also reflective of the notion of man as a
"rational animal." Glanville Williams was possibly thinking along these lines when he suggested
the "seventh month as the beginning of legal protection for the fetus," since "until the brain is
formed there can be no mind" and since "electric potential (brain waves) are discernible in the
seventh month." G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 231 (1970). He
even suggested that this solution would "practically eliminate the present social problem of
abortion." Id. at 232. As the accompanying text points out, "brain waves" are now discernible at
six weeks, before most abortions are performed. Thus, the "brain wave" approach would not
appeal to the pro-abortionists.
146. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Mississippi in State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (I
Walker) 39 (1820), utilized the notion of man as a reasonable creature in determining that a slave
is a person under Mississippi criminal law. This factor was also emphasized by John Locke. See
note 108, supra.
147. MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, May 30, 1969, at 18.
148. See the results of recent experiments of Dr. Dominick Purpura of the Albert Einstein
Medical School, Yeshiva University, reported in the N.Y. Times, May 9, 1975, at 36, ol. 1.
149. Wood, Weightlessness.- Its Implicationsfor the Human Fetus, 77 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 333, 333-36 (1970).
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cessation of total brain function") 5 ' applies to only one end of the life
spectrum. Here again, the Court's birth requirement attempts to render
these factors irrelevant.
(3) Ability to Live Outside the Mother's Womb
For reasons which are not completely clear, the Supreme Court
decided that, although not important for constitutional personhood, viability is an important criterion for the state's assertion of a compelling
interest. In other words, the state can assert its interest in keeping the
fetus alive at "viability," which the Court defined as the point at which
the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid."''I The Court then noted that "[v]iability is usually
placed at about seven months (twenty-eight weeks) but may occur earlier, even at twenty-four weeks."' 52 Here, the Supreme Court, for reasons neither apparent nor offered, utilized scientific data in determining
when a state's interest in the unborn becomes compelling enough to
preclude the abortion but, because of its creation of the birth requirement, rendered the same or similar data irrelevant in its determination
when the right to have constitutional rights begins. Considering that
the Court placed such emphasis on the viability concept, it perhaps
should be of interest that in a study of 650,000 live births in New York
City, over twenty percent of the children born at less than twenty weeks
gestational age survived the neonatal period.' 53 The Court's figures accordingly appear to be unsound. Beyond the soundness of the data,
however, the Court's decision means that prematurely born children
are entitled to all the constitutional protections whereas their counterparts, who are equally individual, older, more competent and better
able to survive outside a mother's womb but not fortunate enough to
have been prematurely born, are without constitutional protection.
D.

The Birth Requirement 1s Arbitrary

It appears that the Supreme Court simply created the birth re150. American Bar Association Resolution, voted and approved by the House of Delegates on
Feb. 24, 1975, cited in 61 A.B.A. J. 463, 464 (1975).
151. 410 U.S. at 160. The Roe Court also failed to consider the significance of an "artificial
womb" which the Court recognized as a "new medical technique." Id. at 161. Will the development of the so-called "artificial womb" push the point of "viability" automatically back several
months, perhaps to a point shortly after conception, thus allowing the state to prohibit abortions
except to preserve the life and health of the mother? In other words, does the protection which the
state can afford the fetus depend upon the "shifting tides of scientific opinion" after all, to use Mr.
Justice Burger's phrase from Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972)?
152. 410 U.S. at 160.
153. See abstract of statistics contained in Horan, Gorby & Hilgers, Abortion and the Supreme
Court. Death Becomes a Way of Lfe, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1972).
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quirement, a requirement which appears to find no support in either
the Constitution itself or in its history. Nor is support for the birth
requirement found in any original reasoning by the Court. The failure
of the Supreme Court to offer an explanation for its birth requirement
causes one to wonder what it is about the nature of birth that makes
other factors, such as those relating to the biological, intellectual and
psychological nature of the fetus, of no constitutional significance. As a
consequence of the Court's birth requirement, such scientific data, assuming it could be proved, as the fact that the fetus "lives," is an "individual," is a "human being" and is essentially identical to a born infant
in all scientifically provable aspects have been rendered irrelevant.
This result is surprising, especially since the Supreme Court has, at
least in recent years, been rather receptive in its decision-making to the
methods, principles and findings of scientifically respectable disciplines
other than law. Brown v. Board of Education'5 4 provides perhaps the

best known example. There, the Supreme Court in its desire to "look

• . .to the effect of segregation itself on public education"' 55 felt no

hesitation in using the behavioral sciences to determine the scope and
application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Brown, of course, is not unique. Since Louis Brandeis established
the tradition by filing his now famous brief, 156 attorneys have attempted with considerable success to persuade judges by means of
materials and data from disciplines other than the law. If, for example,
members of a newly found tribe were intentionally and arbitrarily
killed and their killers, upon being tried for homicide, raised the defense that the victims of the killing were not "persons" under the homicide statute, one would certainly expect the court to consider such nonlegal data as whether the members of the tribe were genetically human,
biologically human, and possessed of human rationality (physiological
and psychological) when it determined whether the members57were entitled to protection under the criminal homicide provisions.
154. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
155. Id. at 492. The Supreme Court then supported its holding with studies from the behavioral sciences in its famous footnote eleven.
156. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), Louis Brandeis, then the attorney for the state
of Oregon, filed a 113-page brief supporting Oregon's maximum-hour legislation for women. A
great part of the brief consisted of economic and sociological data: materials not a part of the
heart of the case. The Supreme Court in Muller explicitly made reference to this brief. Since
then, briefs of this sort have come to be called "Brandeis briefs" and are frequently submitted in
many different kinds of cases. Roe v. Wade is an example of such a case. See P. BREST, PROCESS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 939 (1975).
157.

Cf the approach of the Mississippi Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (I Walker)

39 (1820), for a discussion of how the Court could utilize scientific evidence to determine if the
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It is precisely this tradition, a tradition of keeping judicial decisions compatible with the logic of rational assessment and scientific inquiry, which makes the Supreme Court's reluctance to give recent
scientific and medical data concerning the unborn careful consideration in its decision very difficult to accept. Obviously the Roe Court
was simply following Chief Justice Burger's admonition in Eisenstadt v.
Baird"5' 8 that the "commands of the Constitution cannot fluctuate with
the shifting tides of scientific opinion"' 5 9 because the Court in Roe did
place considerable emphasis on scientific opinion in its determinations
that abortion during the first trimester is safer than childbirth 60 and
that viability occurs at a particular moment (twenty-four to twentyeight weeks). 16 1 Whatever may have been the Court's reasoning, the
effect of its birth requirement has been to render irrelevant a rational
assessment of scientific data about pre-birth stages of human development as well as a scientific inquiry into the nature of pre-born human
life.
V.

UNWANTED PREGNANCY IN PERSPECTIVE

In light of the indications of the Maher, Poelker and Beal cases
that the Court may well be retreating from Roe and of the temptation
which must surely face the judiciary at this point to allow the abortion
problem to be resolved legislatively, a careful study of the protections
which the Constitution provides the fetus is required. The purpose of
this article has been not only to explore the soundness of the birth requirement created by the Supreme Court in Roe as a requisite to membership in the class of constitutional "persons" but also to call for a
reexamination of the whole issue. In brief, there is considerable evidence which suggests that the unborn is and should be considered a
constitutional person, thus entitled to fourteenth amendment protections. If this be true, both the Roe holding as well as a legislative solution permitting abortions for reasons other than a threat to the life of
the mother would have the effect of violating the unborn's right to due
process of law. It would thus follow that both the judicial solution set
forth in Roe and the legislative solution are constitutionally unsound.
A holding that the fetus is a constitutional person would have the
fetus is a living human being. See Krimmel & Foley, Abortion. An Inspection into the Nature of
Human Life and Potential Consequences of Legalizing its Destruction, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 725

(1977).
158.
159.
160.
161.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 470 (Burger, J., dissenting).
410 U.S. at 163.
410 U.S. at 160.
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effect of overruling Roe v. Wade and its progeny. The legal consequences would not, however, be as far-reaching as Roe itself, which
had the effect of declaring century-old criminal abortion
statutes inva163
62
lid, cutting deeply into assumed rights of husbands

and parents,

and creating the possibility of required, at least via legislation, public
financing of abortion. 164 On the other hand, the consequence of the
Roe decision to the aborted fetus is severe and final. This result, of
course, is of no great concern to the rule of law, unless the unborn does
meet the criteria of constitutional personhood and the Court either because of poor reasoning or because of some unstated reason arbitrarily
denied the unborn the constitutional protections due it or unless the
fourteenth amendment is inadequate as a legal device to protect the
fundamental rights of all members of the human family, the avowed
purpose of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment. In either case,
there is reason for concern, for the legal order has failed. Perhaps society has failed as well by not providing other solutions which were acceptable to women facing unwanted pregnancies. Professor John Ely
obviously had a point when he wrote that "having an unwanted child
can go a long way toward ruining a woman's life."' 165 No one is denying the personal tragedy or the hardships involved in an unwanted
pregnancy. The solution, however, should turn on what is being sacrificed to avert the tragedy and hardships. These are hard decisions.
To put these hard decisions in their proper perspective, it must be
borne in mind that constitutional protection of fundamental rights
never takes place in a social vacuum. Rather, the protection of the fundamental rights of one necessarily requires personal sacrifices of some
significance by those against whom the right is enforced. For example,
when the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States federal district
court enforced the first amendment right of the American Nazi Party to
march in Skokie, a sacrifice on the part of the Jewish population in
Skokie was necessarily involved. Similarly, an order requiring desegregation in certain neighborhoods may have the effect of substantially
reducing the market value of the property holdings of those already in
the neighborhood, and the privilege against self-incrimination may,
and occasionally does in the instance of a killer set free, later result in
the sacrifice of the life of an innocent person. To be emphasized here is
that the fundamental human rights theory necessarily implies sacrifices.
162.
163.
164.
165.
(1973).

See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975), discussed at note 127, supra.
Id. See also cases cited in note 127, supra.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof." A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923
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All the great judicial decisions in this area have thus been hard decisions. And the problem of the right to life of the fetus must be viewed
in this context.
But courts as well as people have faced difficult problems before
and have resolved them with dignity and intellectual honesty. Such
was the problem in the famous case of United States v. Holmes,'6 6
where, following a shipwreck, the sailors threw fourteen passengers
overboard to lighten a sinking lifeboat, and Regina v. Dudley & Stephens,167 where two seamen starving after twenty days in an open boat,
killed a youthful companion and fed on his flesh until they were rescued. In both of these cases the doctrine of necessity was raised as a
defense to the men's actions. And "necessity" there was-nothing less
than the lives of those later accused of homicide were at stake. These
were hard decisions for the courts, harder than the abortion decision
because rarely is "necessity" in the abortion situation of the magnitude
of that facing Holmes and Dudley and Stephens. Nonetheless, the
courts held that "necessity cannot justify killing."
Is that what is involved in the abortion controversy? Is abortion
an act of killing? The West German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that it was 168 and sought to resolve the abortion problem in a
manner consistent with its understanding of the values involved and
their authoritative legal principles. In its concluding paragraphs, the
West German Federal Constitutional Court wrote:
The parliamentary discussions about the reform of the abortion law
have indeed deepened the insight that it is the principal task of the
state to prevent the killing of unborn life through enlightenment
about the prevention of pregnancy on the one hand as well as
and through a
through effective promotional measures in society
169
other.
the
on
concepts
social
of
general alteration
Would not such an approach be much more compatible with the deepest values and the authoritative ideals of this society?

166. 26 F. Cas. 360 (1842).
167. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
168. The Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany wrote, in this regard, as follows:
The interruption of pregnancy irrevocably destroys an existing human life. Abortion is
an act of killing; this is most clearly shown by the fact that the relevant penal sanction
• . . is contained in the section "Felonies and Misdemeanors against Life" and, in the
previous penal law, was designated the "Killing of the Child en venire sa mere." The
description now common, "interruption of pregnancy," cannot camouflage this fact.
Jonas & Gorby, supra note 29, at 645.
169. Id. at 660.

HeinOnline -- 4 S. Ill. U. L.J. 36 1979

